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Abstract
A strong negation in da Costa’s Cn systems can be naturally extended from the strong negation (¬∗) of C1.
In [6] Newton da Costa proved the connectives {→,∧,∨,¬∗} in C1 satisfy all schemas and inference rules
of classical logic. In the following paper we present a proof that all logics in the Cn herarchy also behave
classically as C1. This result tell us the existance of a common property among the paraconsistent family
of logics created by da Costa.
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1 Introduction
According to the authors in [6] a paraconsistent logic is the underlying logic for
inconsistent but non-trivial theories. In fact, many authors [2,1] have pointed out
paraconsistency is mainly due to the construction of a negation operator which
satisﬁes some properties about classical logic, but at the same time do not hold the
so called law of explosion α,¬α  β for arbitrary formulas α, β, as well as others
[6].
A common misconception related to paraconsistent logics is the confusion be-
tween triviality and contradiction. A theory T is trivial when any of the sentences
in the language of T can be proven. We say that a theory T is contradictory if
exists a sentence α in the language of T such that T proves α and ¬α. Finally, a
theory T is explosive if and only if T is trivial in the presence of a contradiction.
We can see that contradictoriness and triviality are equivalent if and only if for the
underlying logic the law of explosion is valid[4]. One of the greatest achievements of
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paraconsistent logic is to provide a general framework to the study of inconsistent
theories based on the distinction of contradiction and triviality.
Paraconsistent logics were born in two diﬀerent ways. In 1948, Jaskowski gave
the following conditions that any paraconsistent logic should satisfy [8]:
J1. When applied to inconsistent systems it should not always entail their trivial-
ization;
J2. It should be rich enough to enable practical inferences;
J3. It should have an intuitive justiﬁcation.
Also, in 1963, we can ﬁnd a new approach given by da Costa, who independently de-
ﬁned a set of conditions that a paraconsistent logic should satisfy. These conditions
are the following:
dC1. In these calculi the principle of non-contradiction, in the form ¬(α∧¬α), should
not be a valid schema;
dC2. From two contradictory formulae, α and ¬α, it would not in general be possible
to deduce any arbitrary formula β;
dC3. It should be simple to extend these calculi to corresponding predicate calculi;
dC4. They should contain the most part of the schemata and rules of the classical
propositional calculus which do not interfere with the ﬁrst conditions.
Nowadays we can ﬁnd paraconsistent logics applications in many ﬁelds such as
informatics, physics, medicine, etc. From Minsky’s comment we can see that para-
consistent ideas are an approach in Artiﬁcial Intelligence [10]: ”But I do not believe
that consistency is necessary or even desirable in a developing intelligent system.
No one is ever completely consistent. What is important is how one handles para-
dox or conﬂict, how one learns from mistakes, how one turns aside from suspected
inconsistencies”.
In physics the authors in [11] have established an approach to formalize concepts
in quantum mechanics, the so called principle of superposition, via paraconsistent
methods. In general most of scientiﬁc knowledge as theories can have inconsis-
tencies. Most of the time scientist do not throw away these theories if they are
successful in predicting results and describing phenomena [4].
In the literature we can ﬁnd many proper paraconsistent logics [3] in the sense
of da Costa. The most known paraconsistent logic is C1 which in [6] the author also
introduces an increasingly weaker family/hierarchy of logics called Cn, for 1 ≤ n ≤
ω. Also the authors mention that the strong negation deﬁned in the da Costa’s Cn
systems has all properties of the propositional classical negation.
Finding a strong negation in the Cn hierarchy is interesting because we can col-
lapse a fragment of these logics into classical logic, that is, we can have a translation
which provides an embedding of classical logic into any logic of this Cn system. This
fact is mentioned in many papers [6,5], on the other hand the proof does not explic-
itly appears. In this paper we present an inductive proof about the relation between
strong negation and classical behaviour in the Cn systems. The proof follows from
three lemmas and two theorems. From this proof we can see that many properties
in C1 can also hold in Cn, excluding the obvious ones.
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The organization of this document is as follows: In Section 2 we present basic
background in logic, including deﬁnitions of some basic properties (monotonicity,
cut-elimination, deduction theorem) of the paraconsistent logic Cω that we are going
to work with; In Section 3 we present a inductive proof about the classical behavior
of the strong negation deﬁned in the Cn systems; In Section 4 we study an extension
of Cω called C
′
ω where we show that we can ﬁnd a same increasingly chain of weaker
logics as in Cn systems from the new extension; Finally, in Section 5, we present
some conclusions about the proof presented.
2 Background
We ﬁrst introduce the syntax of logical formulas considered in this paper. Then we
present a few basic deﬁnitions of how logics can be built to interpret the meaning
of such formulas.
2.1 Logic Systems
We consider a formal (propositional) language built from: an enumerable set L
of elements called atoms (denoted a, b, c, ...); the binary connectives ∧ (conjun-
tion), ∨ (disjunction) and → (implication); and the unary connective ¬ (negation).
Formulas (denoted α, β, γ, ...) are constructed as usual by combining these basic
connectives together with the help of parentheses. We also use α ↔ β to abbreviate
(α → β) ∧ (β → α). Finally, it is useful to agree on some conventions to avoid the
use of many parenthesis when writing formulas in order to make easier the reading
of complicated expressions. First, we may omit the outer pair of parenthesis of a
formula. Second, the connectives are ordered as follows: ¬,∧,∨,→,↔, and paren-
theses are eliminated according to the rule that, ﬁrst, ¬ applies to the smallest
formula following it, then ∧ is to connect the smallest formulas surrounding it, and
so on.
We consider a logic simply as a set of formulas that (i) is closed under Modus
Ponens (i.e. if α and α → β are in the logic, then so is β) and (ii) is closed under
substitution (i.e. if a formula α is in the logic, then any other formula obtained by
replacing all occurrences of an atom b in α with another formula β is also in the
logic). The elements of a logic are called theorems and the notation X α is used
to state that the formula α is a theorem of X (i.e. α ∈ X). We say that a logic X
is weaker than or equal to a logic Y if X ⊆ Y , similarly we say that X is stronger
than or equal to Y if Y ⊆ X.
2.1.1 Hilbert proof systems
There are many diﬀerent approaches that have been used to specify the meaning of
logic formulas or, in other words, to deﬁne logics. In Hilbert style proof systems,
also known as axiomatic systems, a logic is speciﬁed by giving a set of axioms (which
is usually assumed to be closed under substitution). This set of axioms speciﬁes, so
to speak, the ”kernel” of the logic. The actual logic is obtained when this ”kernel”
is closed with respect to some given inference rules which include Modus Ponens.
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The notation X α for provability of a logic formula α in the logic X is usually
extended within Hilbert style systems; given a theory Γ, we use Γ X α to denote
the fact that the formula α can be derived from the axioms of the logic and the
formulas contained in Γ by a sequence of applications of the inference rules.
As a example of a Hilbert style system we present next a logic that is relevant
for our work.
Cω [6] is deﬁned by the following set of axiom schemata:
Pos1: α → (β → α)
Pos2: (α → β) → ((α → (β → γ)) → (α → γ))
Pos3: α ∧ β → α
Pos4: α ∧ β → β
Pos5: α → (β → α ∧ β)
Pos6: α → (α ∨ β)
Pos7: β → (α ∨ β)
Pos8: (α → γ) → ((β → γ) → (α ∨ β → γ))
Cω1: α ∨ ¬α
Cω2: ¬¬α → α
Note that the ﬁrst 8 axiom schemata somewhat constrain the meaning of the
→,∧ and ∨ connectives to match our usual intuitions. It is a well known result
that in any logic satisfying Pos1 and Pos2, and with Modus Ponens as its unique
inference rule, the deduction theorem holds [9].
Theorem 2.1 [12] Let Γ and Δ be two sets of formulas. Let θ, θ1, θ2, α and ψ
be arbitrary formulas. Let  be the deductive inference operator of Cω. Then the
following basic properties hold.
1. Γ  α → α (identity theorem)
2. Γ  α implies Γ ∪Δ  α (monotonicity)
3. Γ  α and Δ, α  ψ then Γ ∪Δ  ψ (cut)
4. Γ, θ  α if and only if Γ  θ → α (deduction theorem)
5. Γ  θ1 ∧ θ2 if and only if Γ  θ1 and Γ  θ2 (∧ - rules)
6. Γ, θ  α and Γ,¬θ  α if and only if Γ  α (strong proof by cases)
3 Strong negation in Cn systems
We will start giving some basic deﬁnitions in order to understand concepts needed
in the Cn hierarchy.
Deﬁnition 3.1 ([6]) αo =def ¬(α ∧ ¬α). We will refer to (o) as the consistency
operator.
In fact αo can be seen as a modal operator to the formula α that captures the
idea of consistency/well - behavior in C1.
Deﬁnition 3.2 ([5]) We recursively deﬁne αn, 0 ≤ n < ω as follows:
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(i) α0 =def α
(ii) αn+1 =def (α
n)o
Deﬁnition 3.3 ([5]) We recursively deﬁne α(n), 1 ≤ n < ω as follows:
(i) α(1) =def α
1
(ii) α(n+1) =def α
(n) ∧ αn+1
For the careful reader should not confuse α0 with αo. Basically αn represents n
applications of the consistency operator (o) to the formula α, and α(n) represents a
conjunction of α1, . . . , αn.
Deﬁnition 3.4 ([6]) We deﬁne Cn as an extension of Cω, which includes the fol-
lowing axiom schemas:
Cn1 : β
(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)
Cn2 : (α
(n) ∧ β(n)) → ((α → β)(n) ∧ (α ∨ β)(n) ∧ (α ∧ β)(n))
Also, we can see that in Cn, the axiom Cn1 can be replaced by the axiom schema
(β ∧¬β ∧β(n)) → α. Intuitively from Cn2 we see that α(n) propagates what we call
n-consisteny in Cn. Finally we deﬁne a strong negation in both C1 and Cn.
Deﬁnition 3.5 ([6]) The strong negations for C1 and Cn are deﬁned as:
(i) For C1: ¬∗α =def ¬α ∧ αo
(ii) For Cn: ¬(n)α =def ¬α ∧ α(n)
Lemma 3.6 For all n ∈ N we have that ¬(αn) Cω α
Proof. By induction on n.
Base case (n = 1). By Deﬁnition 3.2 we have that Cω ¬(α1) ↔ ¬(αo). Also
by Deﬁnition 3.1, Cω ¬(αo) ↔ ¬(¬(α ∧ ¬α)), we can expand the last formula
to Cω ¬(α1) ↔ ¬(¬(α ∧ ¬α)). We can use axiom schema ¬¬α → α to prove
Cω ¬(α1) → α ∧ ¬α, which is by axiom schema Pos3 we have Cω ¬(α1) → α.
From this we apply deduction theorem to obtain ¬(α1) Cω α as desired.
Inductive step. We assume by induction hypothesis that ¬(αn) Cω α holds.
Accordingly to Deﬁnition 3.2 we have that Cω ¬(αn+1) ↔ ¬(αn)o, which in fact
is Cω ¬¬(αn ∧ ¬(αn)) ↔ ¬(αn)o. From the latter and using Cω2 axiom and
transitivity property we can prove that ¬(αn+1) Cω ¬(αn), and with the inductive
hypothesis we have that ¬(αn+1) Cω α.  
Lemma 3.7 For all n ∈ N we have that Cω α ∨ αn
Proof. We can see that αn Cω α ∨ αn. On the other hand, due to Lemma 3.6
we have that ¬(αn) Cω α, therefore ¬(αn) Cω α ∨ αn. Applying strong proof by
cases (Theorem 2.1) we have that Cω α ∨ αn.  
Lemma 3.8 For all n ∈ N we have that Cω α ∨ α(n)
Proof. By induction on n.
Base case (n = 1). From Lemma 3.6 we have that Cω α∨αo holds when n = 1.
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Inductive step. We assume by induction hypothesis that Cω α ∨ α(n) holds.
We know from Lemma 3.7 that Cω α ∨ αn+1. Thus Cω (α ∨ α(n)) ∧ (α ∨ αn+1).
Applying the distributive law to the last formula we have that Cω α∨(αn+1∧α(n)),
which in fact it is by deﬁnition Cω α ∨ α(n+1).  
Theorem 3.9 (Excluded Middle) In Cω, we have that Cω α ∨ ¬(n)α
Proof. In Cω we have the following:
Cω (α ∨ ¬(n)α) ↔ (α ∨ (α ∧ α(n)))
Cω (α ∨ ¬(n)α) ↔ (α ∨ ¬α) ∧ (α ∨ α(n))
Cω (α ∨ ¬(n)α) ↔ α ∨ α(n)
Therefore it is only necessary to check that α ∨ α(n) holds, but accordingly to the
Lemma 3.8 this is true.  
The next two theorems follows from a similar proof in [6] where the author
proved the same theorems in C1.
Theorem 3.10 (Reductio Ad Absurdum) In Cn we have that:
(Γ ∪ {α} Cn β), (Γ ∪ {α} Cn ¬β), (Γ ∪ {α} Cn β(n)) ⇒ Γ Cn ¬α
Proof. Using Deduction Theorem we can prove the following from the hypothesis
given: Γ Cn α → β(n), Γ Cn α → β and Γ Cn α → ¬β. By the transitive
rule and the axiom schema Cn β(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)) we
have that Γ Cn α → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)). By the application
of Modus Ponens twice we have that Γ Cn α → ¬α. From this, using theorem
Cn ¬α → ¬α (as an instance of Identity theorem), and axiom schemas Cn α∨¬α
and Cn (α → ¬α) → ((¬α → ¬α) → ((α ∨ ¬α) → ¬α)) we can conclude that
Γ Cn ¬α.  
Theorem 3.11 (Explosive Principle) In Cn we have that:
Cn α → (¬(n)α → β)
Proof. According to the strong negation deﬁnition 3.5, we have that:
α,¬(n)α,¬β Cn ¬α ∧ α(n), therefore α,¬(n)α,¬β Cn ¬α and α,¬(n)α,¬β Cn
α(n). Also we have that α,¬(n)α,¬β Cn α. By the theorem 3.10 is easy to prove
that α,¬(n)α Cn ¬¬β. Cn contains the axiom schemata ¬¬α → α, which it let us
prove that α,¬(n)α Cn β. Finally, applying two times deduction theorem to the
last formula we have that Cn α → (¬(n)α → β).  
Theorem 3.12 The connectives {→,∧,∨,¬(n)} in Cn satisfy all the axiom
schemata and inference rules in classical propositional calculus.
Proof. Any logic in Cn extends the positive logic axioms from Cω. Then, it is only
necessary observe that the following axiom (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β) → (β → α) holds in
Cn
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1. ¬(n)α → ¬(n)β Hypothesis
2. β Hypothesis
3. β → (¬(n)β → α) From Theorem 3.11
4. ¬(n)β → α Modus Ponens (2, 3)
5. ¬(n)α → α Transitivity (1, 4)
6. α → α Identity theorem
7. (α → α) → ((¬(n)α → α) → ((α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α)) Axiom Pos8
8. (¬(n)α → α) → ((α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α) Modus Ponens (6, 7)
9. (α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α Modus Ponens (5, 8)
10. α ∨ ¬(n)α From Theorem 3.9
11. α Modus Ponens (10, 9)
12. (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β), β Cn α 1-11
13. (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β) Cn β → α Deduction Theorem(12)
14. Cn (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β) → (β → α) Deduction Theorem(13)
 
The author in [6] shows the strong negation in C1 has all the properties of the
classical negation. With the above proof we extend this result to the hierarchy of
logics in Cn in the sense that also the strong negation deﬁned for each logic in the hi-
erarchy behaves like the classical negation. This result is interesting because strong
negations exhibit the possibility to develop theories in these paraconsistent logics
to be equivalent to the classical counterpart. People with the desire to study para-
consistent theories that distinguishes between triviallity and explosiveness should
avoid strong negations in their theories.
4 Some Additional Results
In this section we studied a new hierarchy that we called C
′
n. This hierarchy includes
α → ¬¬α to each calculi of the hierarchy Cn. Since ¬¬α → α is valid in each Cn
due to Cω1, then the so called Double Negation Elimination [12] is valid in this
new hierarchy. This property allows us to introduce or eliminate a negation from a
proof. It is interesting to notice that the Double Negation Elimination is not valid
in Intuitionistic Logic due the lack of constructivism of the proof; on the other hand
only one side of the property (α → ¬¬α) is valid in Intuitionism.
We consider really important to study extensions of paraconsistent logics in
order to develop richer and stronger paraconsistent systems that could be used for
any purpose, from application in artiﬁcial intelligence to quantum physics; opening
more possibilities to engineers and scientist respectively. In this section we proved
in a similar way of [7] that C
′
n is indeed a hierarchy. In [7] the authors recursively
deﬁned valuations Tn starting with the logic P
1. For the purpose of our proof we
used P2 [8], in which α → ¬¬α is a valid formula.
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Deﬁnition 4.1 ([8]) Let P2 be the logic deﬁned by the following truth tables,
where 1 and 2 are the designated values:
∧ 1 2 3
1 1 1 3
2 1 1 3
3 3 3 3
∨ 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 3 1 3
→ 1 2 3
1 1 1 3
2 1 1 3
3 1 1 1
¬
1 3
2 2
3 1
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let C
′
ω be an extension of Cω where the following axiom is included:
Cω2
′
: α → ¬¬α
Also, we deﬁne the hierarchy C
′
n just adding α → ¬¬α to each calculi of Cn.
In the following deﬁnition we introduce a valuation of the form of truth tables
called T
′
n. These tables are valuations of n + 2 values (in N) being the only non
designated the greatest (n + 2). We recursively deﬁne these tables beginning with
the logic P2, so T
′
1 is P
2. For T
′
2 we keep the values from the previous table T
′
1 and
we add one more value, in this case 4, which will be the only non - designated value,
notice that the value 3 in T
′
2 is no longer a non - designated value. The valuation
with formulas involving this new value are stated in the following deﬁnition. We
repeated this process to generate the table T
′
n from the table T
′
n−1.
Deﬁnition 4.3 ([7]) We deﬁne T
′
n as truth tables in the following way:
(Base Case) T
′
1 = P
2
(Inductive Step) T
′
n is obtained from T
′
n−1 adding a new value n+ 2 in the current
table as the only non - designated value. The mapping of formulas involving this
new value is deﬁned as follows:
(1) The element in row α and column β of the conjunction table of T
′
n is max(α, β).
(2) The element in row α and column β of the disjunction table of T
′
n is min(α, β).
(3) The element in row α and column β of the implication table of T
′
n is 1 if α = β,
and β otherwise.
(4) Negation: T
′
n gives us the following table:
α 1 2 3 . . . n n + 1 n + 2
¬α n + 2 2 2 . . . n - 1 n 1
In the table above, n = 1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1 are the designated values and n+ 2 is
the only non - designated one. We will use the notation vn(α) to indicate the
valuation of the formula α in the Tn
′ valuation.
We remind the reader to notice that the deﬁnition of conjunction and dis-
junction for the new value is the maximum and minimum element respectively
because the greatest value in the valuation is the non - designated value.
The intuitive idea behind the above negation table is basically permute the
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values 1 and n + 2 in the table and ”shift” one value for the middle values,
except from 2 which remains the same.
Lemma 4.4 In T
′
n we have that vn(α) = vn(α ∧ ¬α) if vn(α) ∈ {3, . . . , n+ 1} and
n ≥ 2.
Proof. By Induction on n:
(Base Case n = 2) It is just enough to ckeck T2
′ valuation.
(Inductive Step) Assume vn(α) = vn(α ∧ ¬α). We see two possible cases.
(1) Case vn+1(α) ∈ {3, . . . , n + 2}. In this case, since T ′n+1 is obtained from T
′
n, we
have that vn+1(α) = vn+1(α ∧ ¬α) from the inductive hypothesis.
(2) Case vn+1(α) = n+3. If vn+1(α) = n+3 then vn+1(¬α) = 1. From this applying
the new rule for conjunction vn+1(α ∧ ¬α) = n + 3, which is vn+1(α), therefore
vn+1(α) = vn+1(α ∧ ¬α).

Lemma 4.5 In T
′
n we have that:
vn(α
o) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if vn(α) = 1
n+ 2 if vn(α) = 2
vn(¬α) otherwise
Proof. By cases:
Case vn(α) = 1. If vn(α) = 1 then vn(¬α) = n+ 2. The new value for conjunction
is applied, so we get vn(α ∧ ¬α) = n + 2. From this vn(¬(α ∧ ¬α)) = 1, which is
vn(α
o) = 1.
Case vn(α) = 2. If vn(α) = 2 then vn(¬α) = 2. Looking up P2 - valuation we can
see that vn(α ∧ ¬α) = 1, from this we have that vn(¬(α ∧ ¬α)) = n + 2, which is
vn(α
o) = 1.
Case vn(α) = n + 2. If vn(α) = n + 2 then vn(¬α) = 1. The new value for
conjunction is applied, hence vn(α ∧ ¬α) = n + 2. From this vn(αo) = 1 as in the
case vn(α) = 1. But also vn(¬α) = 1, so vn(αo) = vn(¬α) as desired.
Case vn(α) ∈ {3, . . . , n + 1}. If n = 1 it is just enough to check T ′1. For n ≥ 2 we
can see from lemma 4.4 that vn(α) = vn(α ∧ ¬α), hence vn(¬(α ∧ ¬α)) = vn(¬α),
which is vn(α
o) = vn(¬α) as desired. 
Lemma 4.6 In T
′
n we have that:
vn(α
(n)) =
{
1 if vn(α) = 1 or vn(α) = n+ 2
n+ 2 otherwise
Proof. By cases:
Case vn(α) = 1. Due to lemma 4.5 vn(α
o) = 1 we observe that the consistency
operator maps 1 to 1. Furthermore, the conjunction vn(α
o ∧ · · · ∧αn) only involves
the value 1. Using T
′
1 we can see that the latter evaluates to 1.
Case vn(α) = n+2. From lemma 4.5 vn(α
o) = vn(¬α) = 1. Therefore vn(α(n)) = 1
by the same reason of last case.
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Case vn(α) = 2. We can see that vn(α
(n)) = n+2, because vn(α
o) involves the new
value n+ 2.
Case vn(α) ∈ {3, . . . , n + 1}. From lemma 4.5 vn(αo) = vn(α) − 1. Let vn(α) =
λ; from this applying (λ − 2) − times the consistency operator to α we obtain
vn(α
λ−2) = 2. In the next application of the consistency operator we will obtain
vn(α
λ−1) = n+2 due to lemma 4.5. Hence n+2 is involved in one of the conjuncts
of αo ∧ · · · ∧ αn. Therefore vn(α(n)) = n+ 2. 
Lemma 4.7 (∀n ∈ N) (C′n α
n)
Proof. By cases:
Case n = 1. It is only necessary to check T
′
1.
Case n ∈ N \ {1}. We claim that if vn(α) = n + 1 then vn(αn) = n + 2. If
vn(α) = n + 1 then vn(α
o) = vn(¬α) = vn(α) − 1 = n, due to lemma 4.5. To
evaluate to 2 we will need to apply (n− 1)− times more the consistency operator.
In the next application of the consistency operator we evaluate vn(α
n) = n+2 due
to lemma 4.5. Therefore vn(α
n) = n+ 2. 
Theorem 4.8 
C
′
n+1
x entails C′n x
Proof. It is only necessary to verify that (A9)n+1 and (A10)n+1 are provable in C
′
n
We wil show that C′n β
(n+1) → ((α → β) → ((¬α → β) → β))
1. β(n) → ((α → β) → ((¬α → β) → β)) (C ′n1)
2. β(n+1) Hypothesis
3. β(n+1) ↔ (βn+1 ∧ β(n))
4. (βn+1 ∧ β(n)) → β(n) (Pos4)
5. β(n) Transitivity (3, 4) and Modus Ponens with 2
6. ((α → β) → ((¬α → β) → β)) Modus Ponens(5, 1)
7. C′n β
(n+1) → ((α → β) → ((¬α → β) → β)) 1 - 6
We wil show that C′n (α
(n+1) ∧ β(n+1)) → (α β)(n+1), where  ∈ {∧,∨,→}
1. (α(n+1) ∧ β(n+1)) Hypothesis
2. (α(n+1) ∧ β(n+1)) → α(n+1) (Pos3)
3. (α(n+1) ∧ β(n+1)) → β(n+1) (Pos4)
4. α(n+1) Modus Ponens(1, 2)
5. β(n+1) Modus Ponens(1, 3)
6. α(n+1) ↔ (αn+1 ∧ α(n))
7. β(n+1) ↔ (βn+1 ∧ β(n))
8. αn+1 ∧ α(n) Modus Ponens(4, 6)
9. βn+1 ∧ β(n) Modus Ponens(5, 7)
10. (αn+1 ∧ α(n)) → α(n) (Pos4)
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11. (βn+1 ∧ β(n)) → β(n) (Pos4)
12. α(n) Modus Ponens(8, 10)
13. β(n) Modus Ponens(9, 11)
14. α(n) → (β(n) → (α(n) ∧ β(n))) (Pos5)
15. β(n) → (α(n) ∧ β(n)) Modus Ponens(12, 14)
16. α(n) ∧ β(n) Modus Ponens(13, 15)
17. (α(n) ∧ β(n)) → (α β)(n) (C ′n2)
18. (α β)(n) Modus Ponens(16, 17)
19. (α β)n+1 Lemma 4.4
20. (α β)(n) → ((α β)n+1 → ((α β)(n) ∧ (α β)n+1)) (Pos5)
21. (α β)n+1 → ((α β)(n) ∧ (α β)n+1) Modus Ponens(18, 20)
22. (α β)(n) ∧ (α β)n+1 Modus Ponens(19, 21)
23. (α β)(n+1)
24. C′n (α
(n+1) ∧ β(n+1)) → (α β)(n+1) 1 - 23

Theorem 4.9 T
′
n is sound w.r.t. C
′
n.
Proof. We will prove that inference rules and all axiom schema in C
′
n are tautologies
in the T
′
n valuation. All proofs in this sections are done by contradiction.
Modus Ponens: We will show that T
′
n preserves Modus Ponens. We assume vn(α)
and vn(α → β) to be designated values. Suppose v(β) evaluates to n+2 (the only
non-designated value in T
′
n). Since vn(α) = vn(β) then vn(α → β) = n+ 2. But
vn(α → β) evaluates a designated value. Contradiction, therefore T ′n preserves
Modus Ponens.
Pos1: We claim that: (∀α, β)(vn(α → (β → α)) = n+ 2).
We assume (∃α, β)(vn(α → (β → α)) = n + 2). Hence vn(α) = vn(β → α) =
n+2. From the latter vn(β) = vn(α) = n+2. But vn(α) = n+2. Contradiction.
Therefore (∀α, β)(vn(α → (β → α)) = n+ 2).
Pos2: We claim that: (∀α, β, γ)(vn((α → (β → γ)) → ((α → β) → (α → γ))) =
n+ 2).
We assume (∃α, β, γ)(vn((α → (β → γ)) → ((α → β) → (α → γ))) = n + 2).
Hence vn(α → (β → γ)) = vn((α → β) → (α → γ)) = n+ 2. Also, from the last
formula vn(α → β) = vn(α → γ) = n+2. From the latter vn(α) = vn(γ) = n+2.
Since vn(α) = n + 2 and vn(α → (β → γ)) = n + 2 then vn(β → γ) = n + 2
due to Modus Ponens. Also, since vn(α) = n + 2 and vn(α → β) = n + 2 then
vn(β) = n + 2. Finally, because vn(β) = n + 2 and vn(β → γ) = n + 2 then
vn(γ) = n + 2. But vn(γ) = n + 2. Contradiction, therefore (∀α, β, γ)(vn((α →
(β → γ)) → ((α → β) → (α → γ))) = n+ 2).
Pos3 and Pos4: We claim that: (∀α, β)(vn((α∧β) → α) = n+2 and vn((α∧β) →
β) = n+ 2)
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Suppose (∃α, β)(vn((α ∧ β) → α) = n + 2). Hence vn(α ∧ β) = vn(α) =
n + 2. Since the conjunction of α and β involves the non-designated value then
vn(α ∧ β) = n + 2, but vn((α ∧ β) → α) = n + 2. Contradiction, therefore
(∀α, β)(vn((α∧β) → α) = n+2). The proof for (∀α, β)(vn((α∧β) → β) = n+2)
is similar to the above proof.
Pos5: We claim that: (∀α, β)(vn(α → (β → (α ∧ β))) = n+ 2).
Suppse (∃α, β)(vn(α → (β → (α ∧ β))) = n + 2). Then vn(α) = vn(β →
(α∧β)) = n+2. From the latter vn(β) = vn(α∧β) = n+2. Since vn(α) = n+2
and vn(β) = n+2 then vn(α∧β) = n+2. Contradiction, therefore (∀α, β)(vn(α →
(β → (α ∧ β))) = n+ 2).
Pos6 and Pos7: We claim that: (∀α, β)(vn(α → (α ∨ β)) = n + 2 and vn(β →
(α ∨ β)) = n+ 2).
Suppose (∃α, β)(vn(α → (α∨ β)) = n+2). That is vn(α) = vn(α∨ β) = n+2.
From the latter we can see that both vn(α) and vn(β) evaluate to n + 2. But
vn(α) = n + 2. Contradiction. Therefore (∀α, β)(vn(α → (α ∨ β)) = n + 2.
Furthemore a similar reasoning we can prove that (∀α, β)((vn(β → (α ∨ β)) =
n+ 2)).
Pos8: We claim that: (∀α, β, γ)(vn((α → γ) → ((β → γ) → ((α ∨ β) → γ))) =
n+ 2).
We assume that (∃α, β, γ)(vn((α → γ) → ((β → γ) → ((α∨β) → γ))) = n+2).
Hence vn(α → γ) = vn((β → γ) → ((α ∨ β) → γ)) = n + 2. From the latter
vn(β → γ) = vn((α ∨ β) → γ) = n+ 2. Also, from this last formula we have that
vn(α∨β) = vn(γ) = n+2. From vn(α∨β) = n+2 at least one disjunct evaluates
to diﬀerent to n+ 2. Suppose vn(α) = n+ 2, then because of vn(α → γ) = n+ 2
we have that vn(γ) = n + 2. Also if vn(β) = n + 2 then vn(γ) = n + 2 due to
vn(β → γ) = n + 2. Contradiction, so (∀α, β, γ)(vn((α → γ) → ((β → γ) →
((α ∨ β) → γ))) = n+ 2).
(Cω1): We claim that: (∀α)(vn(α ∨ ¬α) = n+ 2).
We assume that (∃α)(vn(α ∨ ¬α) = n+ 2). We see two possible cases:
Case 1: We assume that vn(α) = vn(¬α) = n + 2. But this is impossible from
T
′
n deﬁnition.
Case 2: We assume that vn(α) = vn(¬α). We can see two possible sub cases:
Sub Case 1: We assume that vn(α) = n+2. From T
′
n we have that vn(¬α) = 1.
Thefore the disjunction evaluates to vn(α ∨ ¬α) = 1. Contradiction.
Sub Case 2:]We assume that vn(¬α) = n+2. From T ′n we have that vn(α) = 1.
Thefore the disjunction evaluates to vn(α ∨ ¬α) = 1. Contradiction.
In all possible cases we reached a contradiction. Therefore (∀α)(vn(α ∨ ¬α) =
n+ 2).
(Cω2): We claim that: (∀α)(vn(¬¬α → α) = n+ 2).
We assume that (∃α)(vn(¬¬α → α) = n+2). From T ′n we have that vn(¬¬α) =
vn(α) and v(α) = n+2. From the latter we have that vn(¬α) = 1. From the latter
and T
′
n we have that vn(¬¬α) = n + 2, but vn(¬¬α) = vn(α). Contradiction.
Therefore (∀α)(vn(¬¬α → α) = n+ 2).
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(C
′
ω2): We claim that: (∀α)(vn(α → ¬¬α) = n+ 2).
We assume that (∃α)(vn(α → ¬¬α) = n+ 2). From T ′n we have that vn(α) =
vn(¬¬α) and v(¬¬α) = n+2. From the latter we have that vn(¬α) = 1. From the
latter and T
′
n we have that vn(α) = n+ 2, but vn(¬¬α) = vn(α). Contradiction.
Therefore (∀α)(vn(α → ¬¬α) = n+ 2).
(C
′
n1): We claim that (∀α, β)(vn(β(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α))) =
n+ 2).
We assume (∃α, β)(vn(β(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α))) = n + 2).
From T
′
n we have that vn(β
(n)) = vn((α → β) → ((α → ¬α) → ¬α)) and
vn((α → β) → ((α → ¬α) → ¬α)) = n+ 2. From the latter and T ′n deﬁnition we
have that vn(α → β) = vn((α → ¬β) → ¬α) and vn((α → ¬β) → ¬α) = n + 2.
Also by T
′
n deﬁnition and the latter we have that vn(α → ¬β) = vn(¬α) and that
vn(¬α) = n + 2. From the latter vn(α) = 1. Due to vn(β(n)) = n + 2, then due
to lemma 4.6 we have that vn(β
(n)) = 1. The latter implies that vn(β) = 1 or
vn(β) = n+ 2. From this we distinguish two possible cases:
Case 1: vn(β) = 1. If vn(β) = 1 then vn(¬β) = n + 2. we can easily see that
vn(α → ¬β) = n+ 2. But vn(α → ¬β) = vn(¬α). Contradiction.
Case 2: vn(β) = n + 2. If vn(β) = n + 2 then vn(α → β) = n + 2. But
vn(α → β) = vn((α → ¬β) → ¬α). Contradiction.
In all possible cases we reached a contradiction, therefore (∀α, β)(vn(β(n) →
((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α))) = n+ 2).
(C
′
n2) We claim that (∀α, β)(vn((α(n) ∧ β(n)) → (α  β)(n)) = n + 2), where
 ∈ {∧,∨,→}.
We assume that (∃α, β)(vn((α(n) ∧ β(n)) → (α  β)(n)) = n + 2). From T ′n
deﬁnition we have that vn(α
(n)∧β(n)) = vn((αβ)(n)) and that vn((αβ)(n)) =
n + 2. From the latter and lemma 4.6 we have that vn(α  β) ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}.
Since  ∈ {∧,∨,→} we distinguish three possible cases:
Case 1:  =→. In this case we see that vn(α) = vn(β), otherwise the impli-
cation would evaluate to 1. Furthermore we see that vn(α) ∈ {1, . . . , n + 2}
and vn(β) ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}. From the latter and lemma 4.6 we have that
vn(β
(n)) = n + 2. Hence the conjunction evaluates to vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) = n + 2.
But vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) = vn((α → β)(n)). Contradiction.
Case 2:  = ∧. We can see that: vn(α) ∈ {1, . . . , n+1} y vn(β) ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}
and that is not the case vn(α) = vn(β) = 1. From the latter at least one of the
conjuncts of vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) evaluates something diﬀerent of 1. Due to lemma
4.6 at least one of the conjuncts of vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) evaluates to n + 2, hence
vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) = n+ 2. But vn(α(n) ∧ β(n)) = vn((α → β)(n)). Contradiction.
Case 3:  = ∨. We can see that: vn(α) ∈ {2, . . . , n+2} y vn(β) ∈ {2, . . . , n+2}
and that is not the case vn(α) = vn(β) = n + 2. From the latter we see that
at least one of the conjuncts of vn(α
(n) ∧β(n)) evaluates something diﬀerents of
n+ 2. Due to lemma 4.6 at least one of the conjuncts vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) evaluates
to n+ 2, hence vn(α
(n) ∧ β(n)) = n+ 2. But vn(α(n) ∧ β(n)) = vn((α → β)(n)).
Contradiction.
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Theorem 4.10 C
′
n is a hierarchy of paraconsistent logics.
Proof. The result holds from the following reasons:
(1) For each formula x such that 
C
′
n+1
x then C′n x. (Theorem 4.8).
(2) Exists a sound valuation for C
′
n, in this case T
′
n (Theorem 4.9), where (∃x)(C′n
x) and 
C
′
n+1
x. That formula is for instance αn+1 (Lemma 4.7).

5 Conclusions
The presented work gives a general idea how to extend a property in C1 to Cn,
mainly using inductive proofs. We know that all logics in the Cn system are strictly
weaker than C1 [6], perhaps many of them share many things in common as a strong
negation. The section 4 introduce a new hierarchy of paraconsistent logics called
C
′
n which is a stronger chaing than Cn. This new hierarchy could be useful for
theories and applications where the axiom α → ¬¬α is crucial. In the future should
be interesting to investigate how much these logics are related each other among
relevant properties.
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